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I. INTRODUCTION
URING late 2005 and throughout 2006, the developments in
construction and surety law focused on a wide variety of substan-
tive issues, including the long-awaited decisions by the Texas Su-
preme Court addressing the ways in which a public entity does and does
not waive sovereign immunity in the context of construction projects.
The Texas Supreme Court finally decided the issues of waiver by filing
suit and of whether city charter language automatically constitutes
waiver. Courts of appeals continued to issue opinions on a governmental
entity's immunity from suit in the context of a construction dispute.
Courts of appeals also issued decisions regarding the enforceability of
arbitration clauses, general construction disputes, mechanic's liens, the
statute of limitations, the statute of repose, and insurance coverage in the
context of construction disputes.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The issue of sovereign immunity and the waiver of immunity from suit
are among the most common subjects for decisions rendered by the Texas
courts in the construction context for the last several years. In June 2006,
the Supreme Court issued its final decision and ruling on two very impor-
tant waiver of immunity concepts.
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The large number of decisions pending before the supreme court were
the result of the large volume of cases addressing immunity from suit
following the Texas Supreme Court's decisions during 2001 and 2002.
The 2001 opinion in General Services Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation
Company, Inc.' focused on the issue of waiver by conduct and, specifi-
cally, the argument by contractors that the state waived immunity by
merely accepting the benefits of the contract. In that case, the supreme
court concluded that, under the new scheme set forth in Chapter 2260 of
the Government Code, "a party simply cannot sue the State for breach of
contract absent legislative consent under Chapter 107. Compliance with
Chapter 2260, therefore, is a necessary step before a party can petition to
sue the State."'2
The supreme court adopted a consistent approach in 2002 in Texas Nat-
ural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy.3  The issue
presented in the case was whether IT-Davy, a general contractor, could
sue the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission ("TNRCC"),
a state agency, for breach of contract, where IT-Davy argued that it had
fully performed under its contract, but the TNRCC did not fully pay for
services it accepted. The supreme court concluded that merely accepting
the benefits of a contract is insufficient to establish waiver.4 In its conclu-
sion, the supreme court noted its "one route to the courthouse" rule and
emphasized Legislative consent.5 However, the concurring opinion by
Justice Hecht, which agrees with the conclusion reached but disagrees
with the broad language used by the supreme court, contains perhaps the
most significant analysis. Justice Hecht noted that he doubted "whether
governmental immunity from suit for breach of contract can be applied so
rigidly," but declined to decide any broader issues not presented by the
facts of the case.6
With these two Texas Supreme Court cases as a backdrop, contractors
and public entities continued to focus on arguments that a public entity
waives immunity by various types of conduct, and even by the terms of a
city charter. The Texas Supreme Court answered all of these questions in
2006.
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND WAIVER THROUGH FILING SUIT
In 2006, the Texas Supreme Court issued its final opinion, following
rehearing, in the case of Reata Construction Corporation v. City of Dal-
las.7 The final decision clarifies Texas law that a public entity does waive
immunity from suit by filing its own claims in a court of law, but the scope
of that waiver extends only to the monetary sum claimed as damages in
1. 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001).
2. Id. at 597.
3. 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002).
4. Id. at 857.
5. Id. at 860.
6. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring in the judgment).
7. 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006).
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the public entity's claim.8
The claims in Reata arose out of a construction accident causing prop-
erty damage. The City of Dallas issued a license to Dynamic Cable Con-
struction to install fiber-optic cable in a downtown area. Dynamic
subcontracted with Reata to drill a conduit. Reata inadvertently drilled
into a water main, flooding a residential building. The building owner
sued Dynamic and Reata, and Reata filed a third-party claim against the
City of Dallas for alleged negligence in misidentifying the location of the
water main.9
The city filed special exceptions to the Reata claims, asserting that the
claims were not within the Texas Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity.
The City also "intervened" to file claims against Dynamic and later
amended its plea in intervention to assert claims for damages against Re-
ata. The City then filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental
immunity from suit with respect to Reata's claims. Reata responded to
the plea on several grounds, including the contention that governmental
immunity did not apply because the City had subjected itself to jurisdic-
tion by intervening in the lawsuit and seeking affirmative relief. The trial
court denied the city's plea to jurisdiction, but the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the city's intervention in the suit did not waive the
city's right to assert subject-matter jurisdiction.10
In its first decision, issued in 2004, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
earlier case law regarding waiver of the sovereign-immunity doctrine, as a
result of a public entity's decision to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
by filing claims or counterclaims itself. In Reata Construction Corp. v.
City of Dallas, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that a city waives its
governmental immunity from suit by asserting claims for affirmative re-
lief in a lawsuit where it was named as a party.11 Thus, "the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction over Reata's claims against the City."'12
The supreme court's holding in the original Reata was completely con-
sistent both with the discussion by Justice Hecht in IT Davy and with an
established line of authority recognizing that where the state invokes the
jurisdiction of a court by filing suit, it waives immunity from suit for any
claims that are "incident to, connected with, [arise] out of, or [are] ger-
mane to the suit or controversy brought by the State."'13
In its original decision, the Texas Supreme Court properly referred to
and followed earlier decisions by itself and other courts in reaching the
conclusion regarding waiver, including the decisions in Anderson, Clayton
8. Id. at 377-78.
9. Id. at 373.
10. Id. at 373-74.
11. 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408 (Tex. 2004), withdrawn, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006).
12. Reata, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 409.
13. Id.; see Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. State, 62 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1939); State v.
Martin, 347 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e).
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& Company v. State14 and State v. Martin.15 In its discussion, the supreme
court found no reason to draw a distinction between a governmental en-
tity as plaintiff, and a governmental entity who intervenes to seek affirm-
ative relief. In either case, the supreme court concluded that a
governmental entity would subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court
and waive immunity. 16
Following its first opinion in Reata, the Texas Supreme Court granted
rehearing to the parties. In June 2006, the Texas Supreme Court with-
drew its 2004 opinion and issued its new opinion.1 7 The new decision
essentially follows the original holding, but it clarifies the point that the
damages that can be recovered by a contractor in a case where a govern-
mental entity has asserted a claim and waived immunity from suit cannot
exceed the amount of the governmental entity's claim against the
contractor.18
In its decision following rehearing, the Texas Supreme Court devoted
much of its discussion to the Texas Legislature's role in establishing both
the existence of and any waiver of immunity from suit. The supreme
court noted in its decision that it generally deferred to the Texas Legisla-
ture to waive immunity because the Legislature is better suited to address
the conflicting policy issues involved in both the establishment of immu-
nity and the waiver of immunity.1 9 The supreme court also devoted some
time in its decision to noting the importance that the Legislature placed
upon preserving the management of fiscal matters through the appropria-
tions process, and upon protecting the sovereign from suits for money
damages.2 0
Citing its decision from State v. Humble Oil & Refining Company2 l and
Kinnear v. Texas Commission on Human Rights,22 the supreme court con-
cluded that "no ill [would befall]" a governmental entity by "allowing
adverse parties to assert, as an offset, claims germane to, connected with,
and properly defensive to [claims] asserted by the governmental entity. ' 23
Thus, by filing a suit for damages, the City of Dallas left its "sphere of
immunity" and became essentially "an ordinary litigant. '24
With regard to any damages sought by a contractor in excess of the
amounts sought by the city, the supreme court held that there was no
waiver of immunity, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction, unless
the Legislature waived immunity in some other way.2 5
14. 62 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1939).
15. 347 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e).
16. Reata, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 408.
17. Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 373.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 375.
20. Id.
21. 169 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. 1943).
22. 14 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2000).
23. Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 377.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 377.
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This final decision issued in 2006 by the Texas Supreme Court was
clearly a limited version of its initial decision, and clearly a reaction to the
numerous voices that expressed concern about protecting governmental
entities from suits that might result in monetary judgments against the
entities. The doctrine announced is more limited than that in the histori-
cal cases cited by the Texas Supreme Court, and it clearly was an effort by
the supreme court to balance all of the interests before it, rather than to
apply the specific waiver doctrine it had articulated in prior cases.
B. THE SUPREME COURT AND WAIVER CREATED
BY CITY'S COUNTERCLAIM
In City of Irving v. Inform Construction, Inc.,26 the Texas Supreme
Court had the opportunity to apply its holding in the Reata decision to a
counterclaim filed by a city. Inform Construction sued the City of Irving
for breach of contract, and the city filed a counterclaim for breach of the
same contract and asserted a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court de-
nied the City's plea, and the court of appeals affirmed. 27
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that, based upon Reata, the City did
not have immunity from suit for claims germane to, connected with, and
properly defensive to its counterclaim to the extent Inform's claims acted
as an offset against the City's recovery.28 Although the City argued that
the assertion of its compulsory counterclaim should not waive immunity,
the supreme court disagreed, holding that there is no difference between
a compulsory counterclaim and a permissive counterclaim insofar as im-
munity from suit is concerned.2 9 The supreme court also specified that
the City retained "immunity from suit as to Inform's action for monetary
damages arising from claims not germane to, connected with, and prop-
erly defensive to the City's counterclaim" and "immunity from suit to the
extent Inform's damages exceed amounts offsetting the City's monetary
recovery, absent legislative waiver of immunity. '30
This decision makes it clear that it is irrelevant whether a governmental
entity sues first or counterclaims. In either instance, the filing of the
claim will constitute a waiver of immunity from suit for the types of
claims specified.
C. THE SUPREME COURT AND No WAIVER BY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
In Tooke v. City of Mexia,31 the Texas Supreme Court resolved the
long-standing question of whether the language in a city charter that a
city may "sue and be sued" and "plead and be impleaded" unambigu-
26. City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2006).
27. Id. at 693.
28. Id. at 694.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006).
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ously waives immunity from suit.32 The supreme court adopted the mi-
nority view of the various Texas Courts of Appeals, and overruled an
earlier Texas Supreme Court case, in concluding that the language itself
does not constitute waiver.33
The City of Mexia awarded a contract to J.E. Tooke & Sons for a multi-
year contract for services. After the first year of the contract, the City
discontinued the contract because of lack of funding, and Tooke sued for
breach of the contract. The City alleged immunity from suit, and Tooke
argued immunity had been waived by the language of Section 51.075 of
the Local Government Code, which states that a home-rule municipality
"may plead and be impleaded in any court. '34 The court of appeals con-
cluded that such language was ambiguous at best because the fact that
such phrase often appeared with the phrase "sue and be sued" in various
statutes (and the "sue and be sued" language waives immunity according
to Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Brownsville Navigation Dis-
trict35 ) must mean they have different interpretations or effects. 36
The Texas Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that scores of
Texas statutes contain the language "sue and be sued" and "plead and be
impleaded," that the import of such phrases cannot be ascertained apart
from the context in which they occur, and that they are therefore not
unambiguous. 37
In reviewing the history and language of section 51.075, the Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that nothing in the statutory provisions refers to
immunity from suit but rather uses language to refer to a capacity to be
involved in litigation. 38 The supreme court found that its own holding in
Missouri Pacific was "inconsistent with the Legislature's more recent lim-
ited waiver[s] of immunity from suit," and it overruled Missouri Pacific.39
The supreme court then similarly found that "plead and be impleaded"
does not unambiguously waive immunity from suit.40
D. THE SUPREME COURT AND WAIVER BY NEW STATUTE
The Texas Supreme Court remanded seveial cases for further proceed-
ings in light of newly enacted legislation impacting the waiver of immu-
nity in the context of a construction contract. In response to the
significant number of legal disputes over the issue of waiver of immunity
from suit by a public entity in the context of a construction dispute, the
legislation was adopted in 2005, clarifying that a public entity that enters
32. Id. at 328.
33. Id. at 345-46.
34. Id. at 329.
35. 453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970).
36. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 330-31.
37. Id. at 328.
38. Id. at 333.




into a contract waives immunity from suit with respect to any action relat-
ing to the contract.
Section 271.151 of the new statute provides the scope of waiver, namely
"for the purposes of adjudicating a claim for breach of [a] contract" en-
tered into subject to the statute a.4 Section 271.153 limits the amounts of
awards as follows:
(a) The total amount of money awarded in an adjudication brought
against a local governmental entity for breach of a contract subject to
this subchapter is limited to the following:
(1) the balance due and owed by the local governmental entity
under the contract as it may have been amended, including any
amount owed as compensation for the increased cost to perform
the work as a direct result of owner-caused delays or
acceleration;
(2) the amount owed for change orders or additional work the
contractor is directed to perform by a local governmental entity
in connection with the contract; and
(3) interest as allowed by law.
(b) Damages awarded in an adjudication brought against a local
governmental entity arising under a contract subject to this sub-
chapter may not include:
(1) consequential damages, except as expressly allowed under
Subsection (a)(1);
(2) exemplary damages; or
(3) damages for unabsorbed home office overhead.4 2
Section 271.154 provides that adjudication procedures, including re-
quirements to engage in alternative dispute resolution before suit, stated
in the contract are enforceable, except to the extent they conflict with the
statute.4 3 Additional sections of the statute provide that there is no
waiver of immunity from suit in federal court or for tort liability.44 Fi-
nally, attorneys' fees incurred by the local governmental entity or any
other party in the adjudication of a claim by or against a governmental
entity are not awarded unless a written agreement authorizes such an
award. 45
In Sisk Utilities, Inc. v. City of Greenville,46 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the impact that the new provision of the Texas Local Govern-
ment Code may have on claims of immunity from suit.47 Sisk Utilities
sued the City for breach of contract, as well as negligence and other torts,
arising out of a sewer construction project. The trial court sustained the
City's plea to the jurisdiction based upon immunity from suit for all
claims except breach of contract. The court of appeals reversed, holding





46. Sisk Utils., Inc. v. City of Greenville, 197 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2006).
47. Id. at 390.
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that immunity was not waived by section 51.075 of the Local Government
Code or by the city charter. The supreme court agreed, based upon its
holding in Tooke, that the city charter did not waive immunity from
suit.48
The Texas Supreme Court held that, while the case was pending on
appeal, the Legislature enacted provisions in the Local Government
Code, including sections 271.151-272.160, that waive immunity from suit
for certain claims, including municipalities. 49 The supreme court noted
that sections 271.152 through 271.154 "apply to a claim that arises under a
contract executed before [September 1, 2005] ... if sovereign immunity
has not been waived with respect to the claim before that date."5 ° As a
result, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that Sisk should have the op-
portunity to argue in the trial court that the City's immunity was waived
by the Local Government Code.5 1
The Texas Supreme Court also concluded that the new statute did not
provide any waiver in favor of the claims by the Tooke plaintiffs because
they sought recovery of lost profits, which were consequential damages
excluded from the scope of the new statute.52
Finally, in Paula Construction, Inc. v. City of Lytle,53 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals remanded an action to allow the parties to argue the
applicability of the newly enacted Local Government Code regarding im-
munity from suit. 54 Paula Construction entered into a contract with the
City of Lytle to remove sludge materials from wastewater treatment
ponds. A dispute arose, and Paula Construction filed suit for failure to
pay for services it provided. The City of Lytle filed a plea to jurisdiction,
arguing it had not waived immunity from suit for the contract in question.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
Paula Construction appealed, arguing in part that the newly enacted Lo-
cal Government Code applies retroactively to provide a limited waiver of
immunity. Because the contract at issue was entered before September 1,
2005, and because the City did not waive immunity from suit by way of
the language in its city charter, the court of appeals concluded that the
Local Government Code could apply retroactively. 55 The court of ap-
peals remanded for further proceedings in the trial court so that the par-
ties would have the opportunity to address whether the Code applied.5 6
48. See id. at 389-90.
49. Id. at 390.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 197 S.W.3d 325, 346 (Tex. 2006).
53. Paula Constr. Inc. v. City of Lytle, 220 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006,
no pet.)
54. Id. at 18-19.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 18-19.
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E. DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY FOR CONTRACTOR
In GLF Construction Corp. v. LAN/STV, 57 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying Texas law, held that a company performing work on
behalf of a public entity was entitled to limited immunity, just as the pub-
lic entity would have enjoyed. 58 LAN/STV entered into a contract with
Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") to prepare plans, drawings, and
specifications for the construction of an extension to the light-rail system
in Dallas. The engineering contract also required LAN/STV to provide
administrative and supervisory services for the project. DART provided
the plans to general contractors, who would then submit bids to DART
for the contract for construction. The contract was awarded to GLF. By
virtue of the contracts, DART was in privity with LAN/STV and GLF,
but those two entities were not in privity with one another. 59
GLF filed suit against LAN/STV for tort claims of professional negli-
gence. Lacking privity with LAN/STV, it could not assert breach of con-
tract actions. LAN/STV filed a motion asserting derivative sovereign
immunity. It alleged that, as an independent contractor performing
DART's functions, it had the same immunity for tort claims as DART
would have.60
The Fifth Circuit cited Texas law that when "an independent contractor
of [a transportation] entity is performing a function of the entity or of a
regional transportation authority, . ; . the contractor is liable for damages
only to the extent that the entity or authority would be liable if the entity
or authority itself were performing the function. '61 GLF did not dispute
that the engineering and supervisory services provided by LAN/STV fell
within DART's functions as a regional authority. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit found that LAN/STV would be liable for damages to GLF "only
to the extent" that DART would be liable if it had performed the work
itself.62
The Fifth Circuit then turned its attention to the sovereign immunity
principles that would apply to DART in the context of a tort claim, find-
ing that the Texas Tort Claims Act would bar such tort claims. 63 The
Fifth Circuit noted that Texas law limits DART's liability both in terms of
causes of action for which DART may be held liable and the maximum
amount of recovery. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
limitations of the Tort Claims Act would apply to LAN/STV and that it
enjoyed immunity from suit to the extent provided in that statute. 64
57. GLF Constr. Corp. v. LAN/STV, 414 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 557.
59. See id. at 555.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 556 (citing TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6550d (Vernon Supp.
2004-2005)).
62. GLR Constr., 414 F.3d at 556.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 556-57.
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In Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc. v. LAN/STV, 65 the Dallas
Court of Appeals noted two principles not in dispute: governmental im-
munity protects a government entity from lawsuits absent legislative con-
sent, and the DART is created under chapter 452 of the Texas
Transportation Code and enjoys governmental immunity unless waived
by the legislature. LAN/STV argued in the case that it "derive[d] govern-
mental immunity from liability from DART pursuant to section
452.056(d) of the Transportation Code and article 6550d of the Revised
Civil Statutes. '66
Section 452.056(d) provides as follows:
A private operator who contracts with an authority under this chap-
ter is not a public entity for purposes of any law of this state except
that an independent contractor of the authority that, on or after June
14, 1898, performs a function of the authority or an entity under Title
112, Revised Statutes, that is created to provide transportation ser-
vices is liable for damages only to the extent that the authority or
entity would be liable if the authority or entity itself were performing
the function and only for a cause of action that accrues on or after
that date.67
The court of appeals looked at the plain, common meaning of the stat-
ute's words to determine its meaning. Eby argued that LAN/STV was
not immune because the question turned on whether DART would be
immune from liability if it performed the same function (preparation of
construction plans), not whether DART would be immune from liability
for the same type of claim asserted against LAN/STV (negligent misrep-
resentation). Conversely, LAN/STV argued that Eby ignored the phrase
"only to the extent" in the provisions. 68
The court of appeals concluded that the "determination of whether an
independent contractor is entitled to derivative governmental immunity
from liability depends upon an analysis of the function performed, not
simply the characterization of the claim."' 69 The court of appeals inter-
preted the "phrase 'to the extent' to mean that the damages available
against an independent contractor are limited to those damages for which
the governmental entity would [also] be liable."'70 Thus, the court of ap-
peals concluded that LAN/STV did not establish that it would be immune
from liability.71
65. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc. v. LAN/STV, 205 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2006, pet. filed).
66. Id. at 17-18.
67. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 452.056(d) (Vernon 1999).
68. Eby, 205 S.W.3d at 19-20.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 20-21.
71. Id. at 21.
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO AVOID IMMUNITY: INVERSE
CONDEMNATION AND TAKINGS CLAIMS
Texas law is clear that both takings claims asserted under the Texas
Constitution and inverse condemnation claims may be asserted against a
governmental entity, and immunity is not a relevant inquiry. However,
stating a facially valid claim for takings or inverse condemnation is a re-
quirement to avoid dismissal for lack of jurisdiction if the governmental
entity files a plea to the jurisdiction. The Eastland Court of Appeals
faced both types of claims during 2006.
A. TAKINGS CLAIMS AND IMMUNITY
In Evatt v. Texas Department of Transportation,72 the plaintiffs alleged
a takings claim against the State, based upon flooding that occurred to
their homes as a result of construction on a Texas Department of Trans-
portation ("TxDOT") project. The homeowners asserted that the prop-
erty damage was a "taking" without compensation in violation of the
Texas Constitution. The trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction and
dismissed the claim, and the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. 73
In order to assert a takings claim when a governmental entity physi-
cally damages private property to confer a public benefit, a plaintiff must
establish that the governmental entity, "(1) knows that a specific act is
causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage
is substantially certain to result from an authorized government action. ' '74
Because the homeowners did not allege that TxDOT either knew or was
substantially certain that the homes would flood, the homeowners did not
sufficiently allege a takings claim, and immunity from suit protected
TxDOT.7 5
B. INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND IMMUNITY
In City of Anson v. Harper,76 the Eastland Court of Appeals analyzed
the concept of inverse condemnation in the context of a jurisdictional
plea. Harper and the other plaintiffs in the case owned mineral estates in
a section of land in Jones County. The mineral interest was severed from
the surface estate by deed. The plaintiffs executed a mineral lease with
Cottonwood in 2003 for a two-year term, with an option for an additional
year, which Cottonwood exercised. Cottonwood entered into a surface-
use agreement with the surface owner. The surface owner subsequently
executed a warranty deed to convey the surface of the land to the City,
72. Evatt v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4268, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Eastland May 18, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id. at *10.
75. Id. at *13.
76. City of Anson v. Harper, 216 S.W.3d 384, 387-88 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no
pet.).
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subject to the mineral reservation.77
The City acquired the land for the construction of a solid-waste landfill.
The City applied for permits and began clearing the land. Plaintiffs filed
suit, seeking injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment regarding inverse
condemnation, damages, and attorneys' fees. The City filed a plea to ju-
risdiction, arguing that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity.78
The City argued that the "plaintiffs failed to state a claim for inverse
condemnation because they did not show that the City acted with the
intention [of exercising its] eminent domain power" as contrasted with its
rights as a surface owner. 79 Plaintiffs argue they did plead sufficient facts
because they alleged that the "City purchased the surface of their tract,
undertook actions which precluded . . . their access" to minerals, and de-
stroyed property.80
The court of appeals began its discussion with a reference to the Texas
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person's property shall be taken,
damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate com-
pensation being made, unless by the consent of such person." 81 The court
of appeals also referenced the elements of a takings claim: "(1) the City
intentionally performed certain acts (2) that resulted in a taking of prop-
erty (3) for public use."'82 The court of appeals noted that inverse con-
demnation can occur in a "total temporary restriction of access, a partial
but permanent restriction of access, or a temporary limited restriction of
access caused by an illegal activity, a negligent performance of a project,
or any unduly delayed project."'83
Based upon the facts of the case, the court of appeals concluded that
the allegations of the plaintiffs were sufficient to establish a potential tak-
ings claim because the "City's preparatory dirt work and the plaintiffs'
enjoyment of the mineral estate [were] potentially conflicting. '84 More
specifically, the court of appeals held that to the extent the City's actual
development of the property as a landfill interfered with the plaintiffs'
property rights, a takings claim would be alleged.85 As a result, no immu-
nity applied for that claim.86
IV. CLAIMS ON PERFORMANCE BONDS
AND PAYMENT BONDS
During 2005 and 2006, Texas courts considered a variety of questions
concerning performance bonds and payment bonds, particularly the de-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. at 389.
80. Id. at 391.
81. Id. (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 17).
82. Harper, 216 S.W.3d at 391.
83. Id.





gree to which strict compliance with statutes is required to perfect and
enforce a bond claim. The courts of appeals addressing the questions per-
mitted substantial compliance with statutory requirements to be sufficient
to perfect claims but strictly enforced the one-year-limitation period for
suit on a bond.
A. PROPER NOTICES ON A PAYMENT BOND
In Redland Insurance Co. v. Southwest Stainless, L.P.,87 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals concluded that a notice of amount due sent by a sub-
contractor to a contractor by regular mail, rather than certified mail, con-
stituted substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the
McGregor Act and chapter 2253 of the Government Code.88 In that case,
Southwest Stainless was a subcontractor to SAL Saber on a construction
project for the City of Fort Worth. Redland Insurance Company issued
the payment bond required by chapter 2253 of the Texas Government
Code. Stainless provided materials for the project, but Saber did not pay
for them and eventually declared bankruptcy. In the interim, Southwest
Stainless had timely provided notice of its claim to the surety, with a copy
to the general contractor. 89
The court of appeals noted first that, as the McGregor Act is remedial
in nature, "it is to be given the most comprehensive and liberal construc-
tion possible," and that the Act's notice requirements are satisfied by
substantial performance. 90 Stainless provided testimony that notices of
the claim were sent to the contractor by first-class regular mail the same
date they were mailed to the surety. Referring to other decisions of the
Texas courts, the court of appeals concluded that if substantial compli-
ance with the statutory requisites setting forth the information to be in-
cluded in the notice is satisfactory, then mailing notice by first-class
regular mail, rather than certified mail, was also substantial compliance
and sufficient.91
B. TIME LIMITATIONS FOR SUIT ON A BOND
In Fondren Construction, Inc. v. Lumberman,92 the Houston Court of
Appeals for the First District upheld the one-year-limitation period for
filing suit on a bond.93 In January 1999, Westbrook Construction con-
tracted with Briarcliff Housing Development Associates, Inc. ("BHDA")
to provide construction services on apartments. John Deere, as surety,
filed a payment bond covering the work at that time. Around the same
87. Redland Ins. Co. v. S.W. Stainless, L.P., 181 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2005, no pet.).
88. Id. at 511-13.
89. Id. at 511.
90. Id. at 512.
91. Id. at 512-13.
92. Fondren Constr., Inc. v. Lumberman, 196 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
93. Id. at 214-15.
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time, Westbrook contracted with Lumberman to provide work as owner
of Fondren Construction Company. At some point, Westbrook stopped
work. Fondren contended that BHDA promised to pay the amounts due
under the contracts with Westbrook. In February 2000, Lumberman filed
liens for himself and Fondren, and, in October 2000, he sued Westbrook.
He later amended in 2003 to sue John Deere rather than Westbrook, spe-
cifically relying upon the posted payment bond.94
John Deere contended that Fondren could not recover on the payment
bond because it failed to bring suit within one year, as stated by the Prop-
erty Code in section 53.208. In its discussion, the court of appeals re-
ferred to section 53.208(a), which provides that if the bond is recorded at
the time the lien is filed, the claimant must sue on the bond within one
year following perfection of his claim. Because Fondren perfected the
bond claim in February 2000, but did not file suit on the bond until 2003,
the court of appeals found the claim was barred by limitations. 95
The court of appeals also rejected an argument by Fondren that it was
not required to timely file because John Deere and others conspired to
withhold the existence of the bond, despite Fondren's requests for the
bond. The court of appeals determined that the bond was on file since
1999, before Fondren filed its liens, and that the filing was proper notice
to all persons of the existence of the instrument. 96
C. ATTEMPTED COMPLIANCE WITH PROPERTY CODE
New AAA Apartment Plumbers, Inc. v. DPMC-Briarcliff, L.P.,97 re-
viewed the requirements of section 53.211 and section 53.202 of the Prop-
erty Code and the attempted compliance with the requirements in a
particular bond. The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Dis-
trict found that the omission of the language from section 53.202(5), that
the bond must be "conditioned on prompt payment.., not exceeding 15
percent of the contract price," was not fatal, and that the bond substan-
tially complied with the Property Code and protected the property from
liens.98
D. PERFECTION AND NOTICE FOR GOVERNMENT CODE
The perfection and notice requirements of the Texas Government
Code chapters 2253.041 and 2253.073 were at issue in Capitol Indemnity
Corp. v. Kirby Restaurant Equipment and Chemical Supply Co..99 Kirby
provided labor and materials for a public works project for which Capitol
94. Id. at 212.
95. Id. at 214-15 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.208(a) (Vernon 1995)).
96. Fondren Constr., 196 S.W.3d at 215.
97. New AAA Apartment Plumbers, Inc. v. DPMC-Briarcliff, L.P., No. 14-05-00485-
CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8576 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 5, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
98. Id. at *11-13 (discussing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.202(5) (Vernon 2005)).
99. Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Kirby Rest. Equip. & Chem. Supply Co., 170 S.W.3d
144 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
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had issued a payment bond under Texas Government Code section
2253.001(a), and, when the bond had not been paid, sought payment. 100
Under cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor
of Kirby. On appeal, Capitol challenged only the trial court's finding that
Kirby had perfected its claim and provided sufficient notice under sec-
tions 2253.041 and 2253.073.101
Section 2253.073 requires that a beneficiary under a payment bond
properly perfect its claim prior to bringing suit. 102 Perfection requires
notice, which, under section 2253.041(a), requires that the beneficiary
mail written notice to the primary contractor and the surety. Notice must
be "accompanied by a sworn statement of account that states in sub-
stance: (1) the amount claimed is just and correct; and (2) all just and
lawful offsets, payments, and credits known to the affiant have been al-
lowed."'01 3 Kirby mailed a letter to Capitol that contained a sworn docu-
ment entitled Application and Certificate for Payment. The letter stated
that it was intended to provide notice of nonpayment, the sworn Applica-
tion and Certificate for Payment indicated the amount due, that the work
had been "completed in accordance with the Contract Document," and
"that all amounts [had] been paid by the Contractor for work for which
previous Certifications for Payment were issued and payments received
from the Owner .... -1o4
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the sworn document does
not have to strictly conform to the specific language of section
2253.041(c). 10 5 Specifically, the court of appeals found that language in-
dicating that the work was completed in accordance with the contract was
sufficient to show that the charges were "just and correct."'01 6 In addi-
tion, the statement in Kirby's sworn document that all other work had
been properly paid for by the contractor and that only the present
amount was due suggested that "all just and lawful offsets, payments, and
credits known to the affiant have been allowed. ' 10 7 Therefore, the court
of appeals held that the purposes of the statute, "to provide the surety
with knowledge of the substance of the claim" and to give those who
furnish labor and materials "a simple and direct method of providing no-
tice of their claim," were met with Kirby's letter of notice and sworn Ap-
plication and Certificate for Payment. 10 8 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment for Kirby.109
100. Id. at 146.
101. Id. at 146-47.
102. Id. at 147.
103. Id.; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2253.041(c) (Vernon 2005).
104. Kirby, 170 S.W.3d at 147.
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V. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND RIGHTS
A. MANDAMUS PROCEEDINGS ON ARBITRATION CLAUSES
In In re D. Wilson Construction Co.,1" 0 the Texas Supreme Court re-
solved ongoing confusion in the court of appeals concerning whether
those courts have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals based on a
denial of a motion to compel arising out of the Texas Arbitration Act
("TAA") when the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is also impli-
cated.11 ' In addition, the supreme court found that an arbitration clause
incorporated by reference was valid and enforceable against the par-
ties.1 2 Finally, the supreme court further explained the scope of waiver
of arbitration rights.11
3
As to federal pre-emption, the supreme court found that, unless appli-
cation of the TAA was contrary to federal law, the courts of appeals re-
tain jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals concerning a trial court's
denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 114 The court of appeals dis-
missed the interlocutory appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction, finding
that because the contract at issue was "in commerce," the FAA con-
trolled. 1 5 The FAA does not allow for interlocutory appeals but does
allow for mandamus review of a denial of arbitration. The supreme court
reiterated a four-factor test to determine whether the TAA would thwart
the goals and policies of the FAA. "The FAA only preempts the TAA if:
(1) the agreement is in writing; (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it
can withstand scrutiny under traditional contract defenses [under state
law], and (4) state law affects the enforceability of the agreement."'116
Thus, whether a contract affects interstate commerce is only one factor to
consider. The court of appeals had considered it dispositive: "For the
FAA to preempt the TAA, state law must refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because (1) the TAA has
expressly exempted the agreement from coverage,.., or (2) the TAA has
imposed an enforceability requirement not found in the FAA."' 1 7 Be-
cause neither of these conditions were met by the agreement at issue, the
supreme court found that the TAA was not preempted, and that there-
fore the court of appeals retained jurisdiction over the interlocutory
appeal.1 18
In In re Premont Independent School District,119 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court abused its discretion
110. In re Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006).
111. Id. at 780.
112. Id. at 783.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 780.
115. Id. at 779.
116. Id. at 780.
117. Id.
118. Id.




by staying proceedings pending arbitration when the parties had deleted
section 4.5 of the AIA Document A201 contract. In this case, the school
district had contracted with Braselton Construction Company for renova-
tions and additions to the Premont Elementary School, Junior High
School, and High School. Finding that the project was not going to be
completed on time, the district hired a construction-management com-
pany to assist with administration of the project. Ultimately, the district
filed suit against both the contractor and the management company. 20
The contractor asserted a contractual right to arbitration, and the trial
court granted its motion to compel, ordering all of the parties to
arbitrate. 2 1
The school district appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discre-
tion in ordering it to arbitrate its claims against the management com-
pany because a valid arbitration clause did not exist between them. In
particular, the district claimed that, although the parties entered into a
contract that incorporated section 4.5 of the AIA Document A201 con-
tract (the arbitration clause), the parties had adopted a supplementary
condition striking that section.122 The management company countered
that the supplemental condition was not signed and, therefore, did not
operate to cancel the arbitration clause. 123
The court of appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocu-
tory appeal. 124 The court of appeals also held that an unsigned arbitra-
tion agreement may be incorporated by reference in the signed
contract.1 25 No clause in the parties' contract required that supplemen-
tary conditions be signed, whereas it did require contract modifications to
be signed. Because the supplementary condition unambiguously pro-
vided that the arbitration clause was stricken, the court of appeals held
that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the parties to arbi-
trate because no valid arbitration agreement existed between the
parties. 126
B. WAIVER OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
In Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk,1 27 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering all parties to binding arbitration even though the party request-
ing arbitration had not done so as to claims against Grand Homes 96.128
Two of the defendants in this case requested that the owners' claims
120. Id. at 331.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 331 n.2, 333-34.
123. Id. at 334.
124. Id. at 335-36.
125. Id. at 334.
126. Id. at 333-36.
127. Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2006, pet. filed).
128. Id. at 702.
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against them be referred to binding arbitration as per the agreement be-
tween them. The owners, during the hearing on the motion to compel,
pointed out to the trial court that Grand Homes 96 was also a party to the
warranty agreement at issue and that the owners' claims against it should
be referred to binding arbitration.129 The trial court agreed and ordered
all parties to arbitration.130 Grand Homes 96 previously filed a petition
for mandamus which was denied by the court of appeals. The arbitration
resulted in the arbitrator ordering that the contract between Grand
Homes 96 and the owner be rescinded and that Grand Homes 96
purchase the owners' home for $292,000.131 The trial court affirmed the
award. 132
On appeal, Grand Homes 96 contended that the trial court erred by
compelling arbitration of the owners' claims against it when the owners
had not filed a motion to compel those claims (instead, the other defend-
ants had). 133 In addition, Grand Homes 96 complained that the owners
did not file a motion to compel, depriving it of the ability to present de-
fenses to arbitration and to object to the court's appointment of an arbi-
trator. 134 The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to
order the parties to arbitration, notwithstanding that the owners had not
requested the arbitration in a motion to compel, citing to Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code section 171.021(a), which requires only that a
motion to compel be filed by "a party."'1 35
The court of appeals went on to consider Grand Homes 96's argument
that it was deprived of the opportunity to raise defenses to arbitration
because it had no notice that those claims were on the table for arbitra-
tion when the trial court issued its order compelling all parties to arbi-
trate. In particular, Grand Homes 96 argued it was unable to present its
defense of waiver to the trial court. 136 Following United States Supreme
Court precedent, the court of appeals held that Grand Homes 96 had the
opportunity to raise its waiver defense to the arbitrator, and therefore
Grand Homes 96 was not harmed by its unpreparedness to raise the de-
fense to the trial court. 137
The court of appeals reviewed the issue of waiver de novo.138 The
court of appeals held that the owners did not waive their right to arbitrate
their claims against Grand Homes 96, pointing out the strong presump-
tion against waiver, "courts will not find that a party has waived its right
to enforce an arbitration clause by merely taking part in litigation unless
it has substantially invoked the judicial process to its opponent's detri-




133. Id. at 701.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021(a) (Vernon 2005)).
136. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d at 702-03.




ment."'1 39 The only action the owners took was to request that the trial
court compel arbitration once the other defendants were successful in
compelling arbitration of the owners' claims. In addition, because the
case was only eight-months old and very little discovery had taken place,
Grand Homes 96 could not meet its burden to show that it was prejudiced
by the owners' actions. 140 Significantly, the court of appeals rejected
Grand Homes 96's request that the court adopt the holding of the Austin
Court of Appeals in Vireo P.L.L.C. v. Cates,141 which held "after a plain-
tiff files suit, if the defendant does not insist upon arbitration, the con-
tracting parties have mutually repudiated the arbitration covenant as a
matter of law and waived any right thereunder. ' 142 The court of appeals
held that this holding was inappropriate for a multi-defendant lawsuit,
where the plaintiff could be forced to litigate and arbitrate, depending on
the choices of the defendants. 143
C. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARD
The defendant in Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk also challenged
the appointment of the arbitrator by the trial court, claiming that it had
the contractual right to select the arbitrator or to have one appointed by
the American Arbitration Association. 144 After the order to compel was
entered, the owners filed a motion to set aside the trial court's first choice
of an arbitrator. The motion was served on Grand Homes 96, but Grand
Homes 96 did not respond to the motion or file its own. The court of
appeals held that Grand Homes 96 waived its right to challenge the ap-
pointment by waiting until after they had fully participated in the arbitra-
tion and had an adverse award against it.145
Grand Homes 96 also argued that the arbitrator exceeded her author-
ity by granting remedies outside of the warranty's scope, disregarding
limitations, and miscalculating the rescission damages. The owners coun-
tered that, because of the lack of a record of the proceedings, deference
had to be shown to the arbitrator's award. 146
The court of appeals began by stating that, in Texas, review of an arbi-
tration award is extraordinarily narrow and that a "mere mistake of law
or fact" does not allow a court of appeals to set aside the award. 147 The
court of appeals also agreed with the owners that, absent a transcript of
the proceedings, the court must presume that the arbitrator's reasoning
and the evidence were adequate to support the award.1 48 But an appel-
139. Id. at 704.
140. Id.
141. 953 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied).
142. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d at 704 (citing Virco P.L.L.C., 953 S.W.2d at 491).
143. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d at 704.
144. Id. at 705.
145. Id.
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late court can vacate an arbitration award if there is a statutory or com-
mon-law ground to do so. 149 One of the statutory grounds is that the
arbitrator exceeded its power, which is derived from the arbitration
agreement and is limited to a decision of the express or implied matters
submitted therein. 150 Unfortunately for Grand Homes 96, because the
owners' pleadings prayed for rescission and the damages awarded by the
arbitrator, Grand Homes 96's argument that the arbitrator exceeded her
authority was without merit.151
In Holcim (Texas) Limited Partnership v. Humboldt Wedag, Inc.,1 52
Holcim, the owner of a cement production line, brought an arbitration
claim against its contractor under an arbitration clause in a turnkey
agreement. 153 Watkins, the contractor, brought a third-party claim
against Humboldt, a subcontractor in the arbitration. Holcim objected to
the joinder of Humboldt, claiming that Humbolt was not a necessary
party and that there was no arbitration between Holcim and Humboldt.
Humboldt cross-claimed against Holcim for trapped funds and asked the
arbitration panel to order Holcim to pay whatever it owed Watkins di-
rectly to Humboldt. 54 The arbitration panel entered an order bifurcating
the proceedings and, after the first proceeding, found that Watkins did
not substantially complete the project. Holcim was therefore entitled to
damages of almost $5 million.' 55 But the panel also found that Watkins's
breach was not material and that Watkins was entitled to recover $7.5
million from Holcim, leaving a balance due to Watkins of about $2.6 mil-
lion. Holcim then complained that there was no arbitration agreement
between it and Humboldt and that it should not have to pay Humboldt
directly. The panel disagreed, imposing a constructive trust on the $2.6
million. Humboldt moved for the district court to confirm the award,
which it did promptly, leading Holcim to file an interlocutory appeal. 156
The first issue the court of appeals confronted was whether an interloc-
utory appeal was the correct procedural device. In this case, the Federal
Arbitration Act controlled the proceedings. Citing Texas Civil Practices
and Remedies Code section 171.098(a), the court of appeals determined
that a party seeking review of an arbitration award confirmation may do
so by an interlocutory appeal, regardless of whether the arbitration oc-
curred under the Federal Arbitration Act or the Texas Arbitration Act.157
In a second issue, the court of appeals determined that Holcim's peti-
tion to vacate the arbitration award was timely because it was brought
within three months of the arbitration award being mailed to the parties,
149. Id.
150. Id. at 705-06.
151. Id. at 706.
152. Holcim (Texas) Ltd. P'ship v. Humboldt Wedag, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2006, no pet.).
153. Id. at 798.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 800.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098 (a) (Vernon 2005)).
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as required by the section 12 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 158
Humboldt contended that Holcim could not dispute the existence of an
arbitration agreement because Holcim had not sought a stay of the arbi-
tration proceedings. The court of appeals found that there was no re-
quirement that a party file a motion to stay before it filed a motion to
vacate an arbitration award. 159 Humboldt relied on Texas Civil Practices
and Remedies Code sections 171.023 and 171.088, but the court of ap-
peals did not find that a party must file a motion to stay in order to chal-
lenge an arbitration award by filing a motion to vacate. 160 Holcim had
complained to the trial court that Humboldt was not a necessary party
and that there was no arbitration agreement. This was sufficient for
Holcim to preserve its ability to challenge the award.161
Humboldt further argued that Holcim was estopped from denying that
Humboldt's claims were within the scope of the arbitration clause be-
tween Holcim and Watkins because Holcim sought affirmative relief
against Humboldt in the arbitration proceedings. 162 But the court of ap-
peals found that Holcim had objected to consideration of Humboldt's
claims, stating "where a party objects to arbitrability but nevertheless vol-
untarily participates in the arbitration proceedings, waiver of the chal-
lenge to arbitral jurisdiction will not be inferred.' 63 Because Holcim had
objected to the arbitrability of Humboldt's claims before participating in
the arbitration proceedings, Holcim was not estopped from denying that
Humboldt's claims were within the arbitration clause between Holcim
and Watkins. 164
D. NONSIGNATORIES CAN BE BOUND BY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
In Associated Glass, Ltd. v. Eye Ten Oaks Investments, Ltd.,165 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief com-
pelling arbitration to two subcontractors being sued by developer Eye
Ten Oaks in a construction and design defects dispute. 166 The subcon-
tractors did not have contracts directly with the developer, but their con-
tracts with the general contractor contained identical arbitration
provisions. The court of appeals thus framed the issue as whether Eye
Ten Oaks was attempting to assert claims that relied on the contracts be-
tween the subcontractors and the general contractor. If the developer
was relying on the underlying contracts, it could be bound to the arbitra-
tion provision.167
158. Holcrim, 211 S.W.3d at 801-02.
159. Id. at 803.
160. Id. at 802.




165. Associated Glass, Ltd. v. Eye Ten Oaks Inv., Ltd., 147 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
166. Id. at 514.
167. Id. at 512.
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By examining the factual allegations, rather than the legal causes of
action asserted, the court of appeals sought to determine if the claims
were "so interwoven with the contract that [they] cannot stand alone."1 68
If so, then the claim would fall within the scope of the underlying agree-
ment to arbitrate.169 If the claims were "completely independent" of the
contracts between the subcontractors and the general contractor and
"could be maintained without reference to the contract," then the non-
signatory would not be bound to the arbitration agreements between the
subcontractors and the general contractor. 170
The court of appeals found that each specific allegation asserted by Eye
Ten arose out of or related to the duties and obligations created by the
subcontracts. 17 1 Because "a party may not avoid broad language in an
arbitration clause by attempting to cast complaints in tort rather than
contract," the court of appeals held that Eye Ten was bound by the arbi-
tration provisions of the subcontracts and that all of Eye Ten's factual
allegations fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. 172
Similarly, in Cappadonna Electrical Management v. Cameron
County,173 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals had to determine if man-
damus was warranted, compelling Cameron County, Texas, to arbitrate a
dispute with two subcontractors arising out of the construction of a new
prison facility.' 74 Claiming negligence, negligence per se, breach of ex-
press warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty, the County sued both the
general contractor and the subcontractor. The trial court denied the sub-
contractors motion to compel arbitration, granted the contractor's motion
to compel arbitration, and severed the claims against the subcontractors
from those against the contractor.1 75
The subcontractors filed both a request for mandamus and an interloc-
utory appeal. 176 They offered two theories, incorporation by reference
and equitable estoppel, for why the County should be bound to the arbi-
tration provisions of the subcontracts, to which the County was not a
party.177 Ultimately the court denied relief to the subcontractors under





173. Cappadonna Elec. Mgmt. v. Cameron County, 180 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.).
174. Id. at 368-69.
175. Id. at 371.
176. Id. at 369. Mandamus is the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to compel
arbitration arising out of the Federal Arbitration Act, whereas an interlocutory appeal is
the proper course for a denial under the Texas Arbitration Act. The Texas Supreme Court
has instructed courts of appeals to consolidate such proceedings and render a decision that
disposes of both simultaneously. Id.; see In re Valero Energy Corp., 968 S.W.2d 916,
916-17 (Tex. 1998).
177. Cappadonna, 180 S.W.3d at 370. There are six theories recognized by the Texas
Supreme Court for binding a nonsignatory to an arbitration provision: (1) incorporation
by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel; and (6)
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incorporation by reference, but granted mandamus under equitable
estoppel.
The trial court found that the subcontract was not part of the prime
contract between the County and the general contractor, which contained
the arbitration provision at issue.178 The court of appeals agreed, finding
that the intent of the parties to the general contract was to specifically
disclaim any contractual relationship between the County and the sub-
contractors. 179 Thus, the court of appeals found that a nonsignatory third
party cannot be compelled to arbitrate through incorporation by refer-
ence where the party neither signed the agreement nor incorporated it
into a contract that it did sign.180 In other words, a party cannot unilater-
ally bind a third party to an agreement through the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference.181
The subcontractors fared better under the theory of equitable estoppel.
The court of appeals recognized two circumstances under which a non-
signatory can compel a signatory to arbitrate claims between them: "(1)
when the signatory has raised allegations of substantially interdependent
and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of
the signatories to the contract; or (2) when the nature of the signatory's
claims against the nonsignatory requires reliance on the agreement con-
taining an arbitration provision.' 82 That is, if the nonsignatory is at-
tempting to directly benefit from the contract by seeking to enforce the
terms of the contract against one of the signatories, then the nonsignatory
is bound to arbitrate if the contract contains an arbitration provision.' 83
The question of whether a nonsignatory has attempted to derive a di-
rect benefit from enforcement of the contract is a highly fact-specific in-
quiry. A party attempts to derive a direct benefit from the contract when
it seeks to exploit not just the relationship between the signatories, but
the rights and duties of the contract itself.184 Or, as the Texas Supreme
Court said, "when a nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that
others treat it as a party, it cannot later turn its back on the portions of
the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful. A non-
party cannot both have its contract and defeat it too.' 85
VI. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
The Fort Worth and Austin Courts of Appeals briefly addressed certain
issues of mechanics' liens during the Survey period. The Forth Worth
third-party beneficiary. Id. at 370-71; see In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d 732,
739 (Tex. 2005).
178. Cappadonna, 180 S.W.3d at 371.
179. Id. at 372.





185. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 135
(Tex. 2005)).
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Court of Appeals reiterated the priority of liens, while the Austin Court
of Appeals emphasized the specific requirements in a lien affidavit.
A. PRIORITY OF LIENS
In Northside Marketplace W.D. '97, Ltd. v. David Christopher, Inc., 186
David Christopher, Inc. ("DCI"), a materialman, challenged the trial
court's grant of a motion for partial summary judgment invalidating its
materialmen's lien. The contractor argued that the issue was moot be-
cause the property had been foreclosed upon and was no longer owned
by Northside. The contractor asked the Fort Worth Court of Appeals to
take judicial notice of a certified copy of the trustee's deed, which showed
that foreclosure had occurred and that the property was owned by a third
party. But because the materialmen's lien was superior to the deed of
trust, the court of appeals held that the issue of the validity of the lien was
not moot.18 7 Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that there was no
live controversy because the jury in the underlying proceeding had
awarded DCI judgment and damages, which included funds that were
identified as unpaid in the materialmen's lien affidavit and notice of
claim.188 DCI's appeal was therefore dismissed as moot.1 8 9
B. AFFIDAVITS MUST STATE MONTHS OF WORK
TO PERFECT THE LIEN
Milner v. Balcke-Durr, Inc.,190 reviewed various requirements of the
Property Code to perfect a mechanic's lien. American National Power
entered into a contract with Balcke-Durr to act as a general contractor
for the construction of a power plant. Balcke-Durr contracted with AC
Construction which contracted with Milner to supply steel. Milner fur-
nished materials and labor under its contract but was not paid by AC
Construction. Milner attempted to secure payment by perfecting a
mechanic's lien against the property. Balcke-Durr filed a bond to indem-
nify against the lien through its surety, Lumbermens.
Milner sued AC Construction for breach of contract and sued Balcke-
Durr and Lumbermens on the bond. All parties filed summary-judgment
motions. The district court granted the motion of Balcke-Durr and Lum-
bermens, which argued that Milner failed to perfect his lien in the first
instance.
In its de novo review of the issues, the Austin Court of Appeals began
its discussion with the requirements of the Property Code, in Chapter 53,
for perfecting a lien, focusing on the requirements of the contents and
186. No. 2-03-276-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9830 at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth,
Nov. 23, 2005, no pet.).
187. Id. at *14.
188. Id. at *15.
189. Id. at *16.




timing of the affidavit. The court of appeals did not address the issue of
whether a lien affidavit may be filed on the first business day that falls
after the fifteenth day of the month (referenced in Section 53.052 of the
Property Code) but concluded that the lien affidavit did not perfect Mil-
ner's rights because it failed to specify the months during which the work
at issue was performed. 19 1 The court of appeals noted that it was a strict
requirement of Section 53.054(a)( 3) to state each month during which
work was performed and that summary judgment against Milner was
proper for the failure to include that information. 192
VII. CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
The Texas Courts of Appeals faced several interesting construction is-
sues during late 2005 and throughout 2006, including whether a construc-
tion dispute sounds in contract or tort, what the proper measure of
damages is in a construction dispute, and whether a construction defect
may be a DTPA violation.
A. CONTRACT V. TORT CLAIMS
In Hooker v. Nguyen,193 the Houston Court of Appeals analyzed
whether causes of action founded in a construction relationship sounded
in contract or tort. Hooker and his partner entered into a contract with
Nguyen's company, CPN Construction, for Nguyen to perform construc-
tion build-out work in a salon. The original contract did not include a
completion date. 194 Hooker became anxious when, in mid-October, he
noted that Nguyen was failing to make progress on the build-out.
Hooker sent a letter to Nguyen dated November 30, 2000, in which
Hooker claimed that the original due date was December 1, because this
was the date that Hooker was to begin paying rent on the space.195 By
January 18, 2001, the salon was still not complete. The parties met and
signed a document that listed outstanding tasks to be completed by
Nguyen by February 4, 2001. This date passed, and on February 11, 2001,
Hooker notified Nguyen that he was terminating their contract, and on
February 12, 2001, Hooker's lawyer sent Nguyen a letter claiming that he
was "in substantial breach" of the agreement and providing a list of al-
leged deficiencies. 196 Nguyen and Hooker later went over the "punch-
list" document and revised the list. In March 2001, Nguyen sent Hooker
a letter stating that he had finished the punch list work and that he was
owed the remainder of the contract funds. Nguyen claimed that the
amount he was owed was more than ten percent of the contract price.
191. Id. at *8.
192. Id. at *9.
193. No. 14-04-00238-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 20, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id. at *3-4.
196. Id. at *5.
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Hooker's attorney responded, stating that lien waivers from all subcon-
tractors were required before any funds would be paid. Nguyen obtained
lien waivers for all subs, but he was still not paid. 197
Aside from the delays in progress, Hooker claimed that Nguyen im-
properly installed sheetrock, improperly completed painting, installed the
wrong water heaters and air conditioner units, and performed poor
plumbing work. Nguyen filed suit in county court against Hooker and his
partner in 2002 to recover the outstanding contract funds of $44,159.20.198
Nguyen alleged breach of contract, fraud, and failure to make prompt
payment under the Texas Property Code. Hooker counterclaimed for
breach of contract and violations of the DTPA. The DTPA counterclaim
was dismissed based on the statute of limitations, and Nguyen never an-
swered the breach-of-contract counterclaim. 199
At trial, the jury found that Hooker failed to comply with the agree-
ment with Nguyen, that Hooker's failure was not excused, that Hooker
committed fraud, that harm resulted to Nguyen from Hooker's fraud,
that Hooker made misrepresentations upon which Nguyen relied, that
Hooker failed to make prompt payment to Nguyen, and that the failure
to make prompt payment was not excused.200 The jury awarded
$44,159.20 to Nguyen for failure of Hooker to comply with the agree-
ment, $101,666.67 for Hooker's fraud, $44,159.20 for loss of value,
$101,666.67 for misrepresentation, $72,672.56 for attorney's fees, and
$100,000 exemplary damages for Hooker's fraud.2 0 '
Contradictorily, the jury found that Nguyen failed to comply with the
agreement, that the failure to comply with the agreement was a producing
cause of damage to Hooker, that Nguyen did not substantially perform
his obligations under the contract, and that $58,949.00 would compensate
Hooker for his damages. 20 2 The jury also awarded Hooker attorneys'
fees in the amount of $34,599.43.
Hooker appealed the findings of fraud and misrepresentation, and
damages associated therewith, on the basis that the only remedy available
to Nguyen was his breach of contract claim. The court of appeals agreed,
examining both Southwestern Bell Telephone v. DeLanney20 3 and For-
mosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers and Contractors, Inc.,204
and held that in order to determine whether claims sound in tort or in
contract, under Texas Supreme Court precedent, a court should first look
to the source of the duty to act.20 5 In this case, Hooker's duty arose
solely under the agreement with Nguyen, and Nguyen provided very little
197. Id. at *6.
198. Id. at *6-7.
199. Id. at *7.
200. Id. at *7-8.
201. Id. at *8.
202. Id. at *8-9.
203. 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991).
204. 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998).
205. Hooker, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *13.
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evidence of damages other than those for breach of contract and attor-
neys' fees.
The court of appeals held that tort damages are available if the claim-
ant produces evidence of fraudulent inducement. 20 6 Such damages are
not available for common-law fraud. A claim for fraudulent inducement
requires proof that the other party made representations with the intent
to deceive and with no intention of performing as represented. 20 7 Be-
cause Nguyen could only provide evidence of fraud occurring after the
contract had already been formed, a fraudulent-inducement claim was
not available.
Finally, as to the breach-of-contract claims, Hooker argued that be-
cause he had proved conclusively that Nguyen failed to comply with the
contract before Hooker refused to make final payment, the jury findings
on Hooker's breach of contract should have been disregarded as immate-
rial. The court of appeals agreed, holding that Nguyen could only recover
for breach of contract if he proved that he substantially performed. 20 8
The court of appeals applied the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 241 factors to the record evidence and determined that Nguyen had
failed to substantially perform. 20 9 Thus, the court of appeals reversed
and rendered judgment for Hooker on his breach-of-contract claims
against Nguyen.210
B. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AS DTPA VIOLATIONS
In Main Place Custom Homes, Inc. v. Honaker,211 the builder chal-
lenged the judgment of the trial court awarding damages to the owners of
a residence for the builder's violation of the DTPA, fraud in a real estate
transaction, breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and negli-
gence. The property on which the house sat had a very steep grade in the
back. When questioned about the stability of the soil and the foundation
of the house, the builder had responded that the property was stable and
that there would be no problems with the property falling away. The
builder further represented that he built solid homes. The owners relied
on these statements in deciding to buy the house.2 12 The builder, obli-
gated to provide engineering reports before closing, provided two letters
206. Id. at *18.
207. Id. at *21-22.
208. Id. at *24.
209. Id. at *24-26. The factors are: "(a) the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured
party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be de-
prived; (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer
forfeiture; (d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
210. Id. at *25.
211. 192 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
212. Id. at 610.
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opining that a retaining wall was strong enough to withstand pressure
from the foundation and built-up soil.2 13 About two years after closing,
the soil began to slide, and the foundation began cracking and pulling
away from the house. The culprit was an incorrectly installed sprinkler
system that allowed water to seep into the soil below the house, causing it
to slide and bringing the foundation with it. All claims were settled ex-
cept for the claims against the builder. The trial court found in favor of
the homeowners. 214
The builder challenged the trial court's proportionate-responsibility
finding with respect to the DTPA violations. In particular, the builder
argued that the evidence was insufficient to find that it was sixty-percent
responsible when the leaking sprinkler system, which the builder did not
install, caused the water seepage that led to the landslide. 2 15 In order to
recover under the DTPA, a claimant must prove that the defendant's mis-
representations were the producing cause of the claimant's injuries. 2 16
"A producing cause is an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which
in the natural sequence of events produces injuries or damages. '2 17 The
homeowners introduced engineering reports that had been prepared for
the developer and given to the builder before construction began. Those
reports showed that the soil conditions were much less stable than the
builder had represented, that there was not positive drainage around the
property, that the slope of the property was too steep, and that debris fill
did not satisfy recommendations. 2 8 The builder did not share the reports
with the owners and told the owners that further reports were unneces-
sary. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that there were several
different causes of damage to the property but that the DTPA claims
were based on the causal connection between the builder's misrepresen-
tations and the owners' damages. 219 The owners had relied on the
builder's representations and the evidence supported the conclusion that
but for the builder's misrepresentations, the owners would not have in-
curred damages in connection with the property.22 0
The builder also challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evi-
dence of violations of the DTPA laundry list. In particular, the builder
argued that there was no evidence of producing cause and that its repre-
sentations had been mere opinion.22' The court of appeals articulated
three factors to consider in determining whether a statement is an opin-
ion or an actionable misrepresentation: "the specificity versus vagueness
of the statement; the comparative knowledge of the buyer and seller; and
whether the representation relates to a past or current event or condition
213. Id. at 611.
214. Id. at 611-12.
215. Id. at 615-16.
216. Id. at 616.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 617-19.
219. Id. at 619-20.
220. Id. at 620.
221. Id. at 624.
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versus a future event or condition. '222 The court of appeals found that
the builder's statements had been specific as to the stability of the soil
and the home, that the builder was in a better position to know about the
condition of the property, and that the statements applied equally to the
present and future condition of the home and property.2 23 Thus, the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the builder's
misrepresentations violated at least one item on the DTPA laundry list.2
24
Finally, the builder challenged the trial court's finding that the builder
had committed a knowing violation of the DTPA. In order to find that a
violation was committed knowingly, the evidence must show that the mis-
representation was made with actual awareness, at the time of the act.
225
"Actual awareness," however, "does not mean merely that the person is
aware of what they are doing; it means that a person knows that what he
is doing is false, deceptive, or unfair. In other words, a person must think
to himself at some point, 'Yes, I know this is false, deceptive, or unfair to
him, but I'm going to do it anyway." 2 26 The court of appeals found that
there was no evidence to support a knowing violation of the DTPA be-
cause no one "other than an engineer would have been alerted to the
stability problems simply by reading both reports," 227 and the builder was
not an engineer. The court of appeals reversed the award of treble
damages.2 2 8
C. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The propriety of prejudgment interest for breach-of-contract damages
was at issue in Landmark Organization, L.P. v. Delphini Construction
Co.2 2 9 Landmark, the general contractor, subcontracted with Delphini
for roofing materials, labor, and equipment. Landmark was dissatisfied
with Delphini's performance and terminated the contract. Delphini sued
for breach of contract and quantum meruit. A jury found for Delphini on
all issues, and the trial court awarded prejudgment interest on Delphini's
damages at a rate of twelve percent. 230
On appeal, Landmark challenged the award of prejudgment interest.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that prejudgment interest was
available for breach-of-contract damages. 231 Because there is no ena-
bling statute for prejudgment interest on breach-of-contract damages, the
rate of interest is governed by general principles of equity.
2 32
222. Id. at 624.
223. Id. at 625.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 625-26.
227. Id. at 626.
228. Id.
229. No. 13-04-371-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8414 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct.
13, 2005, pet. denied) (men. op.).
230. Id. at *2-3.
231. Id. at *6.
232. Id. at *7.
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The trial court calculated the rate of prejudgment interest based on the
contractual rate of interest that Landmark was entitled to under its con-
tract with Delphini. Although Delphini was not entitled to interest by the
terms of the contract, because Landmark had set the rate for itself in the
contract, the court of appeals held that using that rate for Delphini was
not an abuse of discretion. 233
Landmark also challenged the date from which prejudgment interest
was to be calculated. In particular, Landmark argued that its "pay when
paid" agreement with Delphini prevented the imposition of interest until
it received payment in full from the owner because that is when Delphini
was entitled to payment from Landmark. 234 But the evidence showed
that Landmark had abandoned the "pay when paid" clause by paying
Delphini throughout the course of construction without receiving pay-
ment from the owner. 235 The trial court could have considered this a
waiver of the clause without abusing its discretion.2 36
Finally, Landmark argued that section 28.003 of the Texas Property
Code tolled the accrual of prejudgment interest for "good faith disputes"
related to a construction contract. 237 The court of appeals disagreed,
finding that "while section 28.003 allows a party to withhold prompt pay-
ment in the event of a good faith dispute, it does not exempt this withheld
amount from accruing interest if the withholding party is ultimately found
to be at fault for the breach. '238 Thus, the trial court did not err by calcu-
lating prejudgment interest from the earlier of the date the lawsuit was
filed or the date that Delphini submitted invoices, as allowed by the Texas
Prompt Payment Act.239
VIII. QUANTUM MERUIT
Over the last year, the Houston and Dallas Courts of Appeals ad-
dressed claims of quantum meruit as a means of recovery in a construc-
tion dispute. In Pepi Corp. v. Galliford,240 Galliford, a subcontractor,
sued Pepi Corp., the owner of a restaurant, for quantum meruit. Gal-
liford provided electrical work on the building and submitted invoices to
the contractor but did not receive payment. Galliford contacted Pepi and
spoke to the president of the company, who allegedly said, "I'll make
sure you get paid."'24 ' The trial court entered judgment for Galliford on
his quantum meruit claim.2 42
233. Id. at *11, 14.
234. Id. at *13.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *13-14.
238. Id. at *14.
239. Id. at *14-15.
240. Pepi Corp. v. Galliford, No. 01-05-00788-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1018 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 8, 2007, no pet.).
241. Id. at *2.
242. Id. at *1.
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On appeal, Pepi argued that judgment was improper because quantum
meruit is not available when a contract exists governing the subject mat-
ter of the claim. Quantum meruit recovery can be had, said the Houston
Court of Appeals for the First District, when the plaintiff proves the
following:
(1) that valuable services were rendered or materials were furnished,
(2) for the person sought to be charged, (3) which services and
materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used
and enjoyed by him, (4) under such circumstances as reasonably no-
tified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in perform-
ing such services, was expecting to be paid by the person sought to
be charged.243
But absent a recognized exception, a quantum meruit claim is not
available when an express contract exists that governs the party's per-
formance. 244 The two issues on appeal were whether the fourth element
was met and whether an express contract existed that barred recovery in
quantum meruit.
The court of appeals first noted that the fact that an express contract
does not exist between the plaintiff and the party sought to be charged is
not dispositive because any express contract governing performance will
preclude recovery in quantum meruit. "This rule not only applies when a
plaintiff is seeking to recover in quantum meruit from the party with
whom he expressly contracted, but also when a plaintiff is seeking to re-
cover from a third party foreign to the original but who benefited from its
performance. '2 45 The determinative consideration is whether a contract
covers the materials and services at issue. 246 Here, there was a contract
between Galliford and the general contractor covering the materials Gal-
liford provided on the project. Unless an exception to the general rule
applied, Galliford's quantum meruit claim should have been dismissed.
In Gentry v. Squires Construction, Inc.,247 the construction company
sued the Gentrys, claiming breach of contract and quantum meruit dam-
ages resulting from a residential construction contract entered into by the
parties. The Gentrys refused to pay Squires' final draw request, claiming
numerous construction defects, including the fact that the house had been
built with eight-foot ceilings, whereas the plans and contract called for
ten-foot ceilings.248 The trial court entered judgment for Squires for its
reasonable costs of labor and materials under a quantum meruit the-
ory.249 In addition, the trial court found that the Gentrys' counterclaims
were preempted by the Texas Residential Construction Liability Act
243. Id. at *4.
244. Id. at *10.
245. Id. at *10-11.
246. Id. at *11.
247. Gentry v. Squires Constr., Inc., 188 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
248. Id. at 401-02.
249. Id. at 401.
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("RCLA"). On appeal, the Gentrys challenged both rulings.250
The Dallas Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had not
erred in finding that Squires could collect the reasonable value of its la-
bor and materials under quantum meruit.25 1 There are three ways in
which a contractor can collect the reasonable value of labor and materi-
als: (1) if the services rendered and accepted are not covered by the con-
tract; (2) if the contractor partially performed under the contract, but was
prohibited from completing the contract because of the owner's breach;
and (3) if the contractor breached but the owner accepted and retained
the benefits of the contractor's partial performance. 252 The Gentrys ar-
gued that none of the three ways was available to Squires because Squires
did not substantially comply with the contract. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, holding that, unlike substantial performance, which will bar re-
covery in quantum meruit, the fact that a contractor does not
substantially comply with a contract does not preclude recovery in quan-
tum meruit.253 Here, there was evidence that Squires partially per-
formed, but did not substantially perform, the contract and that the
Gentrys accepted and retained the benefits of that partial performance.
Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing recovery for Squires under
quantum meruit. 254
IX. THE SUBSTANTIAL-PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE
The appellate courts addressed several cases on the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance, and its relationship to a party's ability to sue for
breach of contract, during the Survey period. The cases illustrate how
important the concept of substantial completion is in the construction
context as a means to support a claim for breach, to attempt to excuse the
breach of a condition, and to recover damages.
A. FINAL PAYMENT
In TA Operating Corp. v. Solar Applications Engineering, Inc.,255 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals was faced with an issue of first impression
in Texas: whether the doctrine of substantial performance excuses a con-
tractor's nonperformance of an express condition precedent to final pay-
ment of a contract. The trial court answered in the affirmative, but the
court of appeals disagreed. 256 In this case, the express condition prece-
dent was an all-bills-paid affidavit intended to foreclose the possibility
that TA, the owner, would have to pay twice on the construction of a
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Gentry, 188 S.W.3d at 403.
253. Id. at 404.
254. Id. at 411.
255. TA Operating Corp. v. Solar Applications Eng'g, Inc., 191 S.W.3d 173 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. granted).
256. Id. at 178.
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truck stop.2 5 7
TA did not dispute that Solar had substantially performed under the
contract. Instead, it relied on an express condition in the contract that
stated, "The final Application for Payment shall be accompanied by: ...
iii) complete and legally effective releases or waivers (satisfactory to
OWNER) of all Lien rights arising out of or Liens filed in connection
with the Work. '2 58 At the time that Solar filed suit for final payment, it
had not secured such waivers or releases, and the evidence showed that
liens totaling almost $250,000 existed against the property. 259 The court
of appeals acknowledged that the doctrine of substantial performance
was intended to modify the general common-law rule of strict compliance
with the terms of a contract. 260 The court of appeals distinguished be-
tween "constructive conditions precedent" and "express conditions pre-
cedent. ' ' 261 A constructive condition precedent is one which, though
nowhere to be found in a contract, obligates the other party to perform
once the constructive condition precedent is met, whereas the all-bills-
paid affidavit was an express condition precedent set out in writing in the
contract. 262 The court of appeals held that the doctrine of substantial
performance applies only to constructive conditions precedent, not to ex-
press conditions precedent. 263 In so holding, the court of appeals ren-
dered judgment that Solar take nothing on its breach-of-contract claim.264
B. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE, MATERIAL BREACH,
AND EXCUSED PERFORMANCE
In Hooker v. Nguyen,2 65 the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District found that Hooker, a salon developer, was excused from
paying Nguyen, the contractor, because Nguyen failed to substantially
perform the contract. 266 Hooker contracted with Nguyen to provide
build-out construction work in a salon. The original contract did not in-
clude a completion date.267 As previously discussed, target completion
dates were missed. On February 11, 2001, Hooker notified Nguyen that
he was terminating their contract, and on February 12, 2001, Hooker's
lawyer sent Nguyen a letter claiming that he was in substantial breach of
the agreement. Hooker refused to pay the outstanding balance of
$44,159.20 on the contract. 268
257. Id. at 180.
258. Id. at 177.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 179.
261. Id. at 180 (citing 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 44:53 (4th ed. 2000)).
262. Id. at 177, 180-81.
263. Id. at 180.
264. Id. at 181.
265. No. 14-04-00238-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 20, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
266. Hooker, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *23.
267. Id. at *3.
268. Id. at *6.
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The jury found for Nguyen on the breach of contract issue and that
Hooker was not excused from performing. Contradictorily, the jury also
found that Nguyen had breached the agreement and that he failed to sub-
stantially perform.269 The court of appeals applied the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 241, which contains five factors to determine whether
a failure to perform is material.270 In addition, the court of appeals noted
that section 242 of the Restatement provides "significant circumstances
that aid in a determination of whether a party's duties are discharged
under a contract due to the other party's material breach. T27 1 Those cir-
cumstances are when the failure to perform causes a delay that prevents
the party from making alternative arrangements and whether the contract
has a firm due date that, under the circumstances, indicates that the date
is important. 272
In sum, Nguyen failed to complete the project on time and neglected to
cure his failure to perform, Nguyen's delays prevented Hooker from
making alternative-construction arrangements, and the jury found that
Nguyen failed to substantially perform. Thus, the court of appeals found
that Nguyen's failure to perform was a material breach excusing
Hooker's performance under the contract.2 73 The court of appeals re-
versed judgment against Hooker and rendered judgment that Nguyen
take nothing.274
C. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES
The dispute in RAJ Partners, Ltd. v. Darco Construction Corp.275 arose
from the construction of a Holiday Inn Express in Lubbock, Texas. RAJ
owned the franchise to build the hotel and contracted with Darco to build
it. RAJ withheld the eleventh and twelfth pay applications because it
believed that Darco had failed to perform as required under the contract.
Darco perfected its mechanic's liens and filed suit. The trial court found
for Darco on its breach of contract claim, awarding prejudgment interest,
attorneys' fees, and foreclosure of the mechanic's lien.276 RAJ appealed,
arguing that Darco did not substantially perform.
RAJ's theory for Darco's failure to substantially perform was based on
the fact that the cost to fix Darco's construction exceeded the cost of
mere remediation and that Darco failed to meet the difference-in-value
measure of damages. The Amarillo Court of Appeals began its analysis
by stating the general rule that substantial performance is an equitable
doctrine that allows breaching parties to recover on a contract so long as
269. Id. at *8.
270. Hooker, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *24-26.
271. Id. at *25.
272. Id. at *25-26.
273. Id. at *26-31.
274. Id. at *33.
275. RAJ Partners, Ltd. v. Darco Constr. Corp., 217 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Dec. 8, 2006, no pet. h.).
276. Id. at 642-43.
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the breaching party substantially completed its obligations. 2 77 RAJ ar-
gued that the brickwork done by Darco had to be torn down and recon-
structed. But the trial court's finding of fact was that the defects in the
brickwork were merely aesthetic and not in need of remedy. 278 Because
the brickwork was not in need of remedy, Darco did not have to prove
the remedial cost of the work.279
RAJ next argued that substantial performance was legally impossible
because the reconstruction cost exceeded mere remediation. The trial
found that the defects were aesthetic in nature and did not impair the
structure as a whole. Thus, the defects did not render substantial per-
formance legally impossible.2 8 0 Because the court found Darco had sub-
stantially performed, the difference-in-value measure was inapplicable.
2 81
Thus, RAJ's appeal was overruled, and the trial court's judgment was
upheld, as modified by the court of appeals. 2 82
X. BREACH AND WAIVER OF WARRANTY
In Welwood v. Cypress Creek Estates, Inc.,283 the Welwoods sued
Cypress Creek for damages to the Welwoods' home when the slope be-
hind the house failed. Cypress Creek, doing business as Legacy Lakes,
sold five lots to a custom-home firm owned in part by Curt Welwood.
Legacy Lakes agreed to develop the lots in a good-and-workmanlike
manner in accordance with the City of Frisco's standards but disclaimed
any express or implied warranties regarding the physical condition of the
lots. 284 Welwood's firm agreed to rely on its own inspection and agreed
to accept the lots in "as-is" condition, with all faults and without warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Welwood asserted
that Legacy Lakes' engineer recommended a slope-stability analysis,
which Legacy did not perform during development of the lot. This fail-
ure, Welwood argued, was negligence and a breach of an implied war-
ranty of workmanlike-development services. The trial court granted
Legacy Lakes' motion for summary judgment.2 85
The Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether Legacy Lakes' dis-
claimer of warranties barred the Welwoods' claims. Relying on Luker v.
Arnold 8 6 for the proposition that Texas law implies a warranty of good
and workmanlike development, Welwood argued that the implied war-
ranty of development services cannot be waived or disclaimed. The court
of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court has not recognized such a
277. Id. at 643.
278. Id. at 644.
279. Id. at 645.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 645, 653.
283. Welwood v. Cypress Creek Estates, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006,
no pet.).
284. Id. at 725.
285. Id.
286. 843 S.W.2d 108, 116 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
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duty.2 87 In addition, the warranty urged by Welwood resembled the war-
ranty of good workmanship, which the Texas Supreme Court held was
disclaimable in Centex Homes v. Buecher.288 In that case, the supreme
court held that the implied warranty of good workmanship is a gap-filler
warranty used when the parties do not themselves prescribe the quality of
the construction work being performed.289 Because the parties had
agreed that the property was being sold "as-is," there was no need to
imply a warranty, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment. 290
XI. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND
INSURANCE COVERAGE
In the context of the commercial-liability policy, the question of
whether an alleged construction defect can ever qualify as an "occur-
rence" and trigger an insurer's duty to defend or duty to indemnify in
favor of an insured contractor continues to be a subject of discussion by
the Texas courts. The decisions in 2005 and 2006, especially compared
with those in earlier years, make it clear that this question will be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis and may be dependent upon a particular
court's views about the allegations presented. While the decisions have
indicated that state courts have been reluctant to expand coverage to in-
clude damages for defective work performed by the insured contractor
itself, there continues to be an emphasis on analyzing concepts such as
the definition of "occurrence" and the meaning of "property damage."
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN "OCCURRENCE"
In Grimes Construction, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance
Co.,291 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals had to determine whether a con-
tractor's own negligent construction could constitute an "occurrence"
under a commercial-general-liability ("CGL") insurance policy. The
homeowners had claimed against Grimes for faulty construction and fail-
ure to construct the residence in a good and workmanlike manner. This
underlying litigation settled in favor of the owners for $52,653.51.292
Grimes claimed that Great American owed both a duty to defend and a
duty to indemnify, which Great American denied. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of Great American, and Grimes appealed. 293
As to the duty to defend, the court of appeals applied the "eight-cor-
ners" rule to the underlying litigation, finding that an "occurrence" had
not been alleged because the only "property damage" claimed was the
287. Welwood, 205 S.W.3d at 730.
288. 95 S.W.3d 266, 274-75 (Tex. 2002).
289. Id.
290. Welwood, 205 S.W.3d at 731.
291. Grimes Constr., Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds, Ins. Co., 188 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed).




result of the builder's own conduct.2 94 In particular, the court of appeals
noted that, in order to constitute an "occurrence," an "accident" must be
alleged. 295 By definition, an accident includes, "negligent acts of the in-
sured causing damage which is undesigned and unexpected. '2 96 There
are two factors to be considered in determining whether an act consti-
tutes an accident: "(1) whether the actor intended to cause damage to
others and (2) the reasonably foreseeable effect of the actor's intended
conduct. ' 297 The court of appeals noted that unintended effects are acci-
dental but that intentional conduct is generally not accidental. 298
The court of appeals went on to note that allegations of negligence may
not assert an "occurrence" if the allegations are based on breach of con-
tract or breach of implied warranties. 299 Although other Texas courts of
appeals have found that recasting allegations is an inappropriate evalua-
tion of the merits of the claims, and forbidden by the eight-corners rule,
the court of appeals in this case did just that: "Even though we construe
such allegations in favor of the insured, we hold that the Coxes' negli-
gence allegation is simply a recharacterization of their basic breach of
contract and warranty claims. ' 300 Because the owners' claims all ap-
peared "from the face of the demand for arbitration" to stem from con-
tractual and warranty obligations, there was no alleged "occurrence" as
required under the policy. 30 1
The court of appeals further held that the foreseeable result of non-
compliance with the construction contract is construction defects. 30 2 The
court of appeals also held that the foreseeable result of failing to properly
supervise a subcontractor is construction defects. 30 3 Thus, the court of
appeals concluded that the owners' claims for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, and breaches of warranty were not an "occurrence. "304
In Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance
Co.,305 the Dallas Court of Appeals had to determine whether application
of a synthetic stucco ("EIFS") could constitute a covered "occurrence" or
"property damage" under a CGL policy. The owners of a residence
brought negligence, breach-of-warranty, and breach-of-contract claims
against the builder, Summit, who then filed a claim with Great American
and Mid-Continent Insurance Company, respectively, its prior and cur-
294. Id. at 813.
295. Id. at 810.
296. Id. (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.
1999)).
297. Grimes Constr., 188 S.W.3d at 810.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 811.
300. Id. at 812.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 813.
303. Id. at 815.
304. Id. at 817.
305. Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 202 S.W.3d 823 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).
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rent, CGL carriers, seeking defense and indemnity. 30 6 Both carriers de-
nied Summit's claim on the basis that application of the EIFS was not an
occurrence triggering coverage and did not constitute property damage as
defined by the respective policies. The trial court granted the carriers'
joint motion for summary judgment. 30 7
The Dallas Court of Appeals first noted that the duty to defend arises
when a third party has asserted claims that state a cause of action under
the policy.30 8 The pleadings are construed strictly against the insurer, and
doubts are resolved in favor of coverage. 30 9 But the terms of the policy
still dictate whether a duty to defend has arisen, and the policies at issue
only covered property damage that manifested during the policy period:
"If such damages are not manifested during the policy period, then there
is no 'occurrence' during the policy period. '310
The court of appeals then turned to analyze whether the underlying
claims alleged property damage manifested during the policy period of
either of the policies. The Great American policy was in effect from 1996
to 2000, so if the homeowners' property damage manifested during that
period, then Great American could potentially owe Summit a duty to de-
fend. The only property damage alleged in the owners' petition was that
"since the house was constructed [in 1996], damages have occurred."' 31
The court of appeals held this was insufficient to determine when the
damage manifested. 312 Still, the court of appeals held that summary judg-
ment for Great American was inappropriate because it was Great Ameri-
can's burden to establish as a matter of law that the property damage did
not manifest during the policy period.313
Because the homeowners had sufficiently pleaded property damage,
the court of appeals then turned to whether their property damage consti-
tuted an "occurrence" under the policy. "'Occurrence' means 'an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions.' 31 4 Great American argued that the "busi-
ness-risk" doctrine should apply to bar coverage for property damage
that was the result of the builder's own negligence.
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that "Texas law is
unsettled on whether defective construction constitutes an 'occur-
rence."' 315 But unlike the court in Grimes Construction,316 the court of
appeals held that "negligently created, or inadvertent, defective construc-
tion resulting in damage to the insured's own work which is unintended
306. Id. at 826.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 827.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 828.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 829.
315. Id.
316. See supra, note 283.
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and unexpected can constitute an 'occurrence.'1, 317 The court of appeals
further explained that an intentional act negligently performed results in
unexpected and undesigned consequences that can constitute an
"occurrence." 318
In addition, the "your-work" exclusion did not bar coverage. "The
'your work' exclusion prevents coverage for 'property damage' to the in-
sured's own work arising after a construction project is finished and in the
owner's possession. ' 319 The court of appeals found that the "your-work"
exclusion itself contained an exception for work performed on the in-
sured's behalf by a subcontractor.320 Because the EIFS was prepared and
applied by subcontractors, the "your-work" exclusion did not bar cover-
age. 321 Because the pleadings asserted an "occurrence" within the mean-
ing of the policy, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
granting Great American's motion for summary judgment. 322 The case
was remanded back to the trial court for determination of whether the
alleged property damage manifested during the Great American policy
period.323
The court of appeals also addressed Great American's duty to indem-
nify. The trial court had granted Great American's motion for summary
judgment based on its finding that Summit was not owed a duty to de-
fend. Because the court of appeals held that there was a genuine issue as
to whether Great American owed Summit a duty to defend, the duty to
indemnify was not ruled out and summary judgment was inappropriately
granted. 324
Finally, the court of appeals addressed Summit's argument that it was
owed summary judgment on its claims for the statutory penalty embodied
in Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code for Great American's
wrongful refusal and delay in paying its defense costs. 325 Although the
courts of appeals in Texas are conflicted as to whether the penalty applies
to claims for defense costs, the court of appeals here adhered to its prior
holding that defense costs are not within the purview of Article 21.55, and
held that the trial court did not err in denying Summit's motion for sum-
mary judgment on this point. 326
317. Id.
318. Id. at 830.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 830-31.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 830-31. The court went on to hold that the Mid-Continent policies con-
tained a specific EIFS exclusion that barred Summit's claims. Id. at 831.
324. Id. at 832.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 833.
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XII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
A. LIMITATIONS AND THE DISCOVERY RULE
In Royce Homes, L.P. v. Dyck,327 the central issue was whether un-
tinted windows were inherently undiscoverable such that the statute of
limitations was tolled for breach of a construction contract specifying
tinted windows. The owners brought their breach-of-contract and fraud
claims more than four years after they closed on and conducted a walk
through of the residence. After trial, the jury found for the owners. 32 8
The Beaumont Court of Appeals determined that untinted windows
are not inherently undiscoverable. "An injury is inherently undiscover-
able if it is the type of injury that is unlikely to be discovered within the
prescribed limitations period, despite due diligence. '329 Although there
was some evidence that it is difficult to determine whether a window is
tinted, Mrs. Dyck's testimony showed that she could tell which windows
were tinted and which were not.330 Thus, the discovery rule did not toll
the statute of limitations, which was four years for both breach of con-
tract and fraud. 331
The Dycks' claim for fraudulent concealment was likewise unavailing
because, under Texas law, a seller of residential real estate does not have
a duty to disclose that which a reasonable investigation would reveal.33 2
The court of appeals found that the Dycks' failed to show that a reasona-
ble investigation would not have disclosed that the windows were un-
tinted.333 Thus, Royce was not under a duty to disclose the untinted
nature of the windows. Based on this holding and the holding that the
discovery rule did not operate to toll the Dycks' claims, the court of ap-
peals reversed and rendered judgment for Royce.3 34
B. LIMITATIONS AND THE STATUTE OF REPOSE
In Brent v. Daneshjou,335 the Austin Court of Appeals considered the
interplay of statutes of limitation and repose in the construction and re-
pair of a house that Daneshjou built in 1990. Brent purchased the house
in 1992 and noticed water leaks soon after. Brent contacted Daneshjou
about the leaks, and Daneshjou completed repair efforts in January, 1993.
Again in 1995, Brent noticed that the water leaks were recurring and that
there were new leaks in other parts of the house. Daneshjou again un-
dertook repair efforts and suggested that Brent replace the roof, which he
327. Royce Homes, L.P. v. Dyck, No. 09-06-034-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9484 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont Nov. 2, 2006, no pet.).
328. Id. at *1-2.
329. Id. at *8.
330. Id. at *12-13.
331. Id. at *14.
332. Id. at *18.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Brent v. Daneshjou, No. 03-04-00225-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9249 (Tex.
App.-Austin Nov. 4, 2005, no pet.).
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did. Brent continued to experience problems with the house in the fall of
1998, when the 1992 leak resurfaced. This time Brent did not contact
Daneshjou, and, in December 2001, Brent began extensive mold
remediation. Brent sued Daneshjou on November 22, 2002, complaining
that the original construction was defective and that repairs made by
Daneshjou in 1993 and 1995 were insufficient to correct the water-incur-
sion problems plaguing the house.336
Daneshjou filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the stat-
utes of limitation and repose had expired on all of Brent's claims and,
alternatively, that Brent offered no evidence on his breach-of-contract,
breach-of-warranty, fraud, and DTPA causes of action. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Daneshjou on all claims. The
court of appeals affirmed. 337 The statute of repose at issue is found in
Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code sections 16.008-009 and provides
that, absent several exceptions, the builder of a house is free from liability
ten years after completion of the building for "an action arising out of a
defective or unsafe condition of the real property or a deficiency in the
construction or repair of the improvement. '338 Thus, absent tolling, the
statute of repose expired in 2000.339
Although there was evidence that Daneshjou "cut corners" during the
initial construction of the house, the court of appeals found that there was
no evidence that Daneshjou did so knowing that the house would be dan-
gerous or deficient as a result.340 In addition, the court of appeals found
no evidence that Daneshjou deliberately concealed the deficiencies in
construction that led to Brent's leaks and mold problems while
Daneshjou was endeavoring to repair the leaks.34 1 Thus, the statute of
repose was not tolled on the original construction of the house and all of
Brent's claims concerning the construction of the house were barred. 342
The statute of limitations also ran on most of Brent's other claims
against Daneshjou. The 1993 repairs were barred because Brent discov-
ered that the repairs had been insufficient in 1995, more than four years
before he filed suit. Likewise, absent tolling, claims on the 1995 repairs
would be barred by a four-year statute of limitations expiring in 1999.
The recurrence of the window leak in 1998 ended tolling from the discov-
ery rule.343 But because rediscovery of the leak had been alleged to oc-
cur in the "fall" of 1998, a fact question remained as to whether the leak
had been rediscovered before or after November 22, 1998. 344 Other re-
pairs made in 1995, specifically to the stucco exterior of the house, were
336. Id. at *2-4.
337. Id. at *1.
338. Id. at *11 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(a) (West 2002)).
339. Id. at *10.
340. Id. at *18-19.
341. Id. at *19-20.
342. Id. at *20.
343. Id. at *24.
344. Id. at *24-25.
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not time barred because Daneshjou had not conclusively shown that
Brent should have discovered the defects before 2001, when Brent en-
gaged in mold remediation. 34
5
Unfortunately for Brent, those claims that Daneshjou had not shown
were time barred did not survive Daneshjou's no-evidence motion for
summary judgment. Specifically, Daneshjou argued, and the court of ap-
peals agreed, that Brent produced no evidence of a contract between
them for repair services, no evidence that Daneshjou breached a war-
ranty under the DTPA, no evidence of fraud, and no evidence of proxi-
mate causation on any of Brent's other causes of action. 346 Because
Daneshjou had undertaken the repair services for free, any potential con-
tract failed for lack of consideration. 347 Because Brent had not paid for
the services, he was not a consumer under the DTPA and therefore had
no standing to assert DTPA violations.348 Finally, the court of appeals
agreed with Daneshjou that Brent produced no evidence of proximate
cause on any alleged negligence or breach of warranty with respect to
Daneshjou's repair work.349
XIII. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT
In Gentry v. Squires Construction, Inc.,35° the Dallas Court of Appeals
had to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the Gen-
trys' DTPA counterclaims were preempted by the Texas Residential Con-
struction Liability Act ("RCLA"). The court of appeals first noted that
the RCLA does not create a cause of action because it does not "provide
a complete structure for liability" or "contain a description of what con-
duct will result in liability or an express statement of the elements of a
cause of action."'351 The RCLA modifies certain causes of action con-
cerning residential construction defects. The court of appeals held that
the RCLA does not preempt the DTPA even though the DTPA is men-
tioned as a cause of action in the RCLA.352 The court of appeals also
held that the RCLA "clearly authorizes suits for breach of contract or
breach of warranty after" certain presuit requirements are met.353 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in dis-
missing the Gentrys' DTPA claims; the judgment was reversed and
remanded back to the trial court on those claims.354
In Hernandez v. Lautensack,3 5 5 the owner sued Hernandez for breach
345. Id. at *25
346. Id. at *28-32.
347. Id. at *28.
348. Id. at *29-30.
349. Id. at *32.
350. Gentry v. Squires Constr., Inc., 188 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
351. Id. at 404.
352. Id. at 405.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 406, 411.




of contract, misrepresentation, fraud and deceptive trade practices in con-
nection with a roof that Hernandez had installed on Lautensack's home.
The new roof suffered from leaks that Hernandez was unable to remedy.
Hernandez told Lautensack that Hernandez could replace the roof for
$9,100 in labor if Lautensack provided all new slate tiles at a cost of
$25,000. Unhappy with Hernandez's original and repair work, Lauten-
sack hired another contractor to replace the roof. On February 12, 2003,
Lautensack sent, by certified and regular mail, a claim notice to Her-
nandez describing the problems with the roof and threatening litigation
unless Hernandez paid Lautensack $41,880. The certified letter was re-
turned unclaimed, and the regular letter was not returned.356 Thereafter,
Lautensack filed suit on April 17, 2003. Hernandez responded with a
plea in abatement, claiming that Lautensack's presuit notice was insuffi-
cient under the RCLA. The case was tried to a jury that found for
Lautensack on all causes of action and awarded damages of $24,750 plus
attorneys' fees of $10,680. The jury also found that Lautensack's notice
was untimely because it did not allow Hernandez the opportunity to in-
spect the alleged defects and offer to repair them. The trial court disre-
garded these findings and entered judgment on the verdict. 357
On appeal Hernandez raised three points. First, Hernandez claimed
that the trial court should not have disregarded the jury findings and
should have dismissed Lautensack's lawsuit. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals noted that the RCLA requires a claimant seeking damages re-
sulting from construction defects to give the contractor sixty-days written
notice before filing suit. 358 The contractor then has thirty-five days after
receiving notice to inspect the property, and forty-five days to make a
written offer of settlement. 359 The RCLA was amended in 2003 to pro-
vide that failure of timely notice results in dismissal of the suit. But this
case arose under the prior version of the RCLA, which provided only for
abatement during the presuit notice period.360
Hernandez argued that, by replacing the roof before sending notice,
Lautensack deprived Hernandez of the opportunity to inspect the roof
and offer to repair the defects. The court of appeals rejected Her-
nandez's argument that judgment should have been entered for him, find-
ing that "the practical effect of Hernandez's argument is to engraft the
dismissal provision of the current RCLA onto the prior version that con-
trols this case. '361 The court of appeals also held that the intent of the
RCLA to provide the contractor with a reasonable opportunity to inspect
and offer settlement was effected in this case because Hernandez in-
spected the roof and made an offer of settlement when he attempted to
356. Id. at 774.
357. Id. at 775.
358. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005)).
359. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a)-( b)).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 776.
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repair leaks and submitted a bid to Lautensack to replace the roof.362
Hernandez further argued that there was no evidence that Lauten-
sack's claimed cost of repair was reasonable. "A party seeking recovery
for the cost of repair must prove their reasonable value. '363 Lautensack
introduced expert testimony of the contractor who replaced his roof. The
contractor testified to Hernandez's original construction defects and that
the roof needed to be replaced. The contractor's bid of $32,330 to replace
the roof was paid in full by Lautensack. In addition, evidence showed
that Hernandez himself had charged $20,000 for the original roof installa-
tion, and offered to replace the roof for $9,100 plus $25,000 in materials.
Based on this evidence, the court of appeals concluded that there was
some evidence supporting the jury's damage award. 364
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 777.
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